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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PAYMENT: AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE?

No good common law pleader engaged in preparing a declaration in
an action of assumpsit, whether special or general, would omit an allegation of breach of promise if he expected to sustain his pleading against
attack.1 The fact that the contract relied on merely called 2 for the pay-3
ment of money, as would be the case on a promissory note, or a lease,
in no way changed this requirement. The defendant, in turn, by specific
traverse or under the general issue, was able to show that no breach had
occurred in such cases, say, because the sum promised had, in fact, been
paid. By so doing, the defense of payment, though affirmative in nature,
was negative in form, hence the burden of proof lay on the plaintiff to
prove nonpayment rather than on defendant to establish the satisfaction
of the claim. 4 Proof of nonpayment, however, might be rendered easier
by the use of presumptions, such as the one arising from plaintiff's possession of the uncancelled note. 5
The pleading reforms introduced in the English common law system
7
0
through the Hilary Rules, by restricting the use of the general issue,
placed on the defendant the duty of using special pleading to question
many of the matters previously traversed by that compendious denial.
,Among the special pleas thus required, the one asserting payment as a
defense became affirmative in form, hence, though plaintiff was still
obliged to allege breach of contract even in money cases, the burden of
proof of payment, whether on or after due date, thereafter rested on the
defendant. 8 Liability in such cases, enforcible in litigation, must undoubtedly rest upon the maker's default by failure to pay upon the maturity of
the instrument. Logic would dictate, therefore, a different rule of proof.
But one which required the plaintiff to take the affirmative of the issue
as of one day, and put the responsibility on the defendant as of the next
day, if payment was delayed, though logical, would hardly be practical in
its operation.
The codifiers of the procedural reforms developed in the United
States were not ignorant of these facts when, in their desire to eliminate
I Chitty, A Treatise on Pleading (8th Ed. Dunlap), I, 331.
8 Chitty, op. cit., II, 549.
2 Chitty, op. cit., I, 114.
4 Chitty, op. cit., II, 476. Paramore v. Johnson, 1 Ld. Raymond 566, 91 Eng.
Rep. 1278 (1700); though defendant might plead specially if he wished, Vanhatton
v. Morse, 2 Ld. Raymond 787, 92 Eng. Rep. 25 (1702).
5 Ritter v. Schenk, 101 1l1. 387 (1882).
6 3 William IV, c. 42, § 1; Chitty, op. cit., I, 733. Though the Hilary Rules, as
such, were not binding on American courts, the early Illinois courts applied them
270, 27 N. E. 452 (1891)],
[McNulta, Receiver v. Lockridge, Administrator, 137 Ill.
and later, using stare decisis as a basis, refused to retract their error [The
Chicago Union Traction Company v. Jerka, 227 Ill. 95, 81 N. E. 7 (1907)].
7 Rules, Hilary Term 4 William IV, Chitty, op. cit., I, 742: ". . . the plea of
non-assumpsit shall operate only as a denial in fact of the express contract or
promise alleged .. "
8 Fidgett v. Penny, 1 C. M. & R. 108, 149 Eng. Rep. 1014 (1834).
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the general issue as a form of answer which concealed rather than revealed the defense, 9 they promulgated the requirement that certain enumerated defenses, including payment, had to be set forth in an affirmative answer whether affirmative or not according to substance.' 0 What
did they accomplish thereby with reference to the defense of payment?
There is some authority for the view that such a provision, when applied to an action based on a money contract, makes it unnecessary for
the plaintiff to either allege or prove nonpayment." In such jurisdictions
the substantive cause of action must be taken as one in which breach of
contract, in money cases, is not an essential, i.e. the justiciable cause is
choate from the moment of execution and delivery of the instrument except as its enforcibility may be temporarily suspended in the interval between making and maturity. Other forms of contractual liability, however, are dealt with as heretofore, 12 so that, in such situation, no cause
of action exists until breach, either partial or total, has occurred.
By far the majority of the American jurisdictions still require the
plaintiff, in any contractual situation, whether requiring the payment of
money or the performance of some act, to allege, as an essential element
of his complaint, some breach by the defendant even if it requires only
the use of the simple phrase "which said sum the defendant has failed
(or refused) to pay."'13 These states, recognizing the fundamental nature
of the cause of action, are, at least, preserving a logical symmetry in the
requisites of a good complaint without attempting to draw discrimination
between types of contractual obligations. The difficulty develops, in such
jurisdictions, when the defendant prepares his answer. If he has performed the promised act, his answer should logically be a simple denial
of the allegation of breach, fulfilling the intrinsic function of a denial by
resting on the theory that plaintiff never acquired a cause of action
against him. 14 If, however, his defense is payment, whether paid according to the promise or subsequent to maturity, he is forced to use an affirmative answer akin to the common law plea of confession and avoid9 Il.Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 164, and see note to Section 40 in Illinois Civil
Practice Act Annotated 85.
1o Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 167. The list contains some truly affirmative
defenses such as release, discharge, and laches; others which under former
systems of pleading were treated as affirmative by reason of the procedural
rule forbidding plaintiff from anticipating a defense (e.g. license), or relieving
plaintiff of the necessity of alleging that his claim rested on a written instrument
(e.g. statute of frauds); while still others were intrinsically negative defenses
tending to show that plaintiff never had a cause of action against the defendant,
e.g. duress, illegality, nondelivery, fraud in the execution, and want of consideration.
11 Rossiter v. Schultz, 62 Wis. 655, 22 N.W. 839 (1885). See dicta in Archambeault v. Jamelle, 100 Conn. 690, 124 A. 820 (1924), and First National Bank v.
Strait, 71 Minn. 69, 73 N.W. 645 (1898).
12 Supervisors of the Town of Franklin v. Kirby, 25 Wis. 498 (1870).
13 Lent v. New York & Massachusetts Ry. Co., 130 N. Y. 504, 29 N.E. 988
(1892). For collection of cases, see Alison Reppy, "The Anomaly of Payment as
an Affirmative Defense," 10 Corn. L. Q. 269 (1925).
14 Such is the case in one jurisdiction, Yancey v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 42
Mont. 342, 112 P. 533 (1910).
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ance, 15 and, in theory, is forced to admit that plaintiff once had a cause
of action which has since, by the payment, become discharged. In strict
logic, such an affirmative defense would impose the burden of proof on
defendant as well as the duty of raising the issue.' 6
The problem has not been squarely decided by an Illinois court since
the adoption of the Civil Practice Act, but an intimation is expressed in
the specially concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor in First National
Bank & Trust Company of Evanston v. Simon,17 that, despite the anomalous nature of the pleadings, the duty is still on the plaintiff to prove
nonpayment of the amount claimed due even though the issue be introduced into the case by an affirmative answer filed by defendant as required by Section 43(4) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act.' 8 No recognition
seems to have been given to the sound policy of the law that, regardless
of the order of pleadings, the burden of proof may be easier discharged
15 Clark v. Mullen, 16 Neb. 481, 20 N.W. 642 (1884), where payment was made
contemporaneously with sale, but defendant was forced to use an affirmative
answer. Contra, McDonald v. Faulkner, 2 Ark. 472 (1840). A distinction is
drawn, however, in suits based on official bonds, where the payment relied on is
made in compliance with the provisions thereof, rather than as satisfaction
after a breach has occurred, Barker v. Wheeler, 62 Neb. 150, 87 N.W. 20 (1901).
In such cases a denial form of answer is proper, equivalent to the common law
plea of non-damniftcatus, Chitty, op. cit., I, 485y; Kaye v. Waghorn, 1 Taunt.
428, 127 Eng. Rep. 900 (1809). Such matter may not be shown under the general
issue of non est factum, Beggs, Administrator v. Chicago Bonding & Surety
Company, 207 Ill.
App. 621 (1917).

16 McKyring v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 297 (1857). Such seems to have been the case in
Illinois prior to the adoption of the Civil Practice Act. At an early date the
proof could be offered under the general issue, Crews v. Bleakley, 16 Ill. 20
(1854), but later was given under a plea supported by notice, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933,
Ch. 110, § 46, or under a separate plea of payment, The Whitaker Paper Company
v. Galesburg Mail Company, 238 Ill. App. 600 (1925). For the practice in equity
proceedings see Ritter v. Schenk, 101 111.387 (1882).
17 312 Ill.
App. 214, 38 N.E. (2d) 360 (1941). A ten-year lease had been executed
calling for a lump sum rental due in advance. Six months after executing the
lease, the lessor transferred the premises to plaintiff as trustee under a trust
agreement. Five years later lessor died, leaving a will appointing plaintiff as
executor. After appointment as executor, plaintiff sued in its dual capacity, as
trustee under the agreement and as executor under the will, to recover the rent
allegedly due from the lessee-defendant. Upon plaintiff's motion, the suit was
dismissed as to the trustee, and prosecuted by plaintiff as executor. Defendant
filed an affirmative answer, as required, alleging payment of the rent to lessor
during her lifetime. At the trial plaintiff introduced the lease in evidence and
rested. Defendant sought to testify as to the payment, but was deemed incompetent by reason of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 51, § 2. Defendant then introduced
the trust agreement in evidence and contended that the cause of action, if any
existed, was vested in the trustee. The trial court so held, and its judgment for
defendant was affirmed. The majority opinion makes no reference to the procedural question here considered. It is interesting to note that the parties regarded the matter of payment as a true affirmative defense, to be pleaded and
proved by the defendant. The concurring opinion states that plaintiff alleged
non-payment of the rent but "made no attempt to prove non-payment and therefore made no case by merely introducing the lease in evidence." 312 Ill. App.
214, 217, 38 N.E. (2d) 360, 361 (1941).
18 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 167(4).
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by the one able to show the affirmative than by him who must prove the
negative of any proposition. No help can be drawn from the manner of
dealing with the related problem of pleading and proving performance of
conditions precedent in contract cases, as the context of Rule 13(3) of the
Illinois Supreme Court 19 shows no intention to change the original burden
for an alteration in the former method of allegof proof though providing
20
ing such matter.
Clarification of the question seems highly desirable and may take one
of two forms:
Regard payment as a true affirmative defense which must be
both pleaded and proved by the defendant; 21 or
Require defendant to introduce the question by an answer merely affirmative in form but actually negative in fact, since it will
be a negation of plaintiff's necessary allegation of nonpayment,
leaving the burden of proof on the plaintiff.

(a)
(b)

The first suggestion may be accomplished by legislative amendment of
Section 43(4) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act. 22 The second, by the application through judicial decision of the thought perhaps already implicit
in the statute, but clearly expressed in the opinion above mentioned.
W. F. ZACHARIAS
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JURISDICTION OF TIM SUPREME CouRT.-Section 75 of the Illinois Civil Prac-

tice Act1 provides for appeals from the Appellate Courts to the Supreme
Court in certain cases. It specifically denies the right to appeal in actions
sounding in contract or damages where the amount involved is not
large. 2 In Martin v. Martin's Estates the plaintiff filed three distinct
19 Inl. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.13(3).
20 Bigelow, Trustee v. Oglesby, Executrix, 302 Ill.App. 27, N.E. (2d) 378 (1939).
21 In such case plaintiff probably would be obliged to file a reply denying
receipt of payment, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 156, or else be regarded as
admitting such defense, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 164(2). Such is the view in
Hubler v. Pullen, 9 Ind. 273 (1857) and Benicia Agricultural Works v. Creighton,
21 Ore. 495, 28 P. 775 (1892). Contra: Frish v. Caler, 21 Cal. 71 (1862), in which
state a reply is never used, Van Giesen v. Van Giesen, 10 N. Y. 316 (1852), State
ex rel. Spaulding v. Peterson, 142 Mo. 526, 39 S.W. 453 (1897).
22 The constitutionality of legislation changing the burden of proof in civil
cases is not open to doubt, but must be exercised with care by reason of the
provisions of the Illinois Constitution, 1870, Art. IV, § 13, regarding the subjects
which may be included under one title, since the matter would primarily involve
amendment of An Act in regard to evidence and depositions in civil cases, Laws
1871-2, 405, found in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941. Ch. 51.
1 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 199 (2).
2 Ill.Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 199 (2) provides for appeals to the Supreme

Court:

"Provided, however, that . . . in actions ex contractu . . . and in

all

cases sounding in damages, . . . the judgment, exclusive of costs, shall be for
fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500.00) or more .
8 377 Ill. 392, 36 N.E. (2d) 742 (1941).
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claims against his mother's estate which totalled $4334. The county court
disallowed the claims; the circuit court held that two items were barred
by the statute of limitations and submitted the third item to the jury
which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $934. The Appellate
Court affirmed this decision 4 and the plaintiff, without a certificate of
importance from that court, moved the Supreme Court for leave to appeal from the decision on the ground that the amount in controversy
was in excess of $1500. Plaintiff relied on one earlier Illinois case 5 which
seemed to sustain his contention. The Supreme Court, however, in the
instant opinion dismissed the petition to appeal being careful to point out
that the earlier Illinois cases were decided prior to 1907 under statutes
which used the phrase "the amount involved"; whereas the present act
uses the word "judgment." In this connection the court said: "In cases
where the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, [jurisdiction to review] is
based upon the amount of the 'judgment' and not upon the 'amount
involved,' as, under prior acts." '
That portion of the Civil Practice Act now under consideration follows
generally the language used in section 121 of the Practice Act of 19077 as
amended in 1929.8 The original language fixed the jurisdictional amount
at $1000, and made the "sum or value in controversy" the test of the
right to appeal. By the 1929 amendment a different standard was introduced, one of two-fold nature depending on who succeeded in the trial
court. If the plaintiff won, the basis for appellate review depended on
the amount of the judgment; if judgment ran against the plaintiff, he
could secure review only if a certificate was issued to the effect that
there was fairly involved a claim of $1500 or more. Whenever the plaintiff's judgment was for less than the jurisdictional amount, review thereof beyond the appellate court was not possible. 9 Following adoption of
the present provision it was but natural for the court to give the same
interpretation to the clear language of the statute. It has now done so.
A new but somewhat related problem was presented in the case of
Antosz v. Goss Motors, Inc.,' 0 in which four persons injured in one auto310 Ill.
App. 259, 33 N.E. (2d) 713 (1941).
5 Estate of Guyer v. Caldwell, 189 Ill.
581, 60 N.E. 50 (1901), in which the
court said: "The claim of the appellee as filed in the circuit court was for more
than $1,000, and the appeal by him was from a judgment of that court refusing to
allow him the amount of his claim. There is nothing in the record to show that
he in any way abandon any part of his claim. . . . The amount in controversy
in the circuit court, and also in the Appellate Court, was more than $1,000, and
by the terms of the statute either party was given the right to appeal to this
court." 60 N.E. 50 at p. 51.
6 377 Ill. 393, 36 N.E. (2d) 742, 743 (1941).
7 Laws 1907, p. 468.
8 Laws 1929, p. 578.
9 Funk v. Kempton, 235 Ill.
280, 85 N.E. 218 (1908); Dale v. Modern Woodmen
of America, 237 Ill. 499, 86 N.E. 1065 (1909); La Monte v. Kent, 253 Ill. 230, 97
N.E. 387 (1912). In the last cited case the court said: "Under the present statute
a judgment in an action ex contractu, or in an action sounding in damages
which does not exceed $1,000, may only be brought from the Appellate Court to
this court for review where the Appellate Court shall grant a certificate of importance." 97 N.E. 387 at p. 388.
10 378 Ill. 608, 39 N.E. (2d) 322 (1942).
4
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mobile accident joined as plaintiffs though each sought independent relief. 1 ' Their claims were tried together resulting in separate verdicts
and separate judgments for the several plaintiffs in varying amounts but
aggregating $1600. After these judgments had been affirmed in the Appellate Court 12 the defendant, without a certificate of importance, attempted to secure leave to appeal from the Supreme Court on the ground
that the amount involved was in excess of $1500. That court, upon motion,
13
refused to grant such request pointing out that earlier Illinois cases
which had construed the provision regarding the jurisdictional amount
required that the judgment must in each case be in excess of the statutory
requirement. These cases were regarded as still applicable and not affected by the fact that since 1933 it has been possible for several plaintiffs,
having separate and distinct demands, to join in one proceeding where,
theretofore, each one would have been obliged to sue separately. The
consolidation of these several claims resulting in total judgment against
defendant in excess of the jurisdictional amount does not change the
fact that each claim is to be treated as a distinct one, and, hence, review
thereof by the Supreme Court is not possible unless the judgment for the
individual litigant exceeds the statutory requirement.
Necessarily left undetermined, because not involved, is the problem
of the scope of review to be granted where one plaintiff has such a judgment but the amounts awarded the other joined plaintiffs fall short of the
required figure. It would seem that any review granted on the larger
claims should not affect the rights of the other parties whose claims
would have been regarded as finally established in the Appellate Court
had they seen fit to sue separately. 14 A rather freak result is, however,
possible in the event the Supreme Court should decide the larger claim
has no legal support while being left powerless to disturb the judgments
1
D. A. ESLING
rendered on the companion smaller claims. 5
11 Joinder was permitted by reason of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 147.

311 Ill. App. 254, 35 N.E. (2d) 688 (1941).
Martin v. Stubbings, 126 Ill. 387, 18 N.E. 657, 9 Am. St. Rep. 620 (1888); Farwell v. Becker, 129 Ill. 261, 21 N.E. 792, 6 L. R. A. 400, 16 Am. St. Rep. 267 (1889);
Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Weir, 134 Ill. 137, 24 N.E. 771 (1890); Fehr Construction
Co. v. Postl System, 288 Ill. 634, 124 N.E. 315 (1919).
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 199.
12
13

15 By the time such decision was reached it would be too late for the Appellate
Court to grant a certificate of importance on the smaller demands, since proceedings thereon must be taken within twenty days after final judgment has been
pronounced in the Appellate Court. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.32.

